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PLEA BARGAIN NEGOTIATIONS: DEFINING COMPETENCE
BEYOND LAFLER AND FRYE
Cynthia Alkon*
Bargaining is, by its nature, defined to a substantial degree by personal style.
The alternative courses and tactics in negotiation are so individual that it may
be neither prudent nor practicable to try to elaborate or define detailed
standards for the proper discharge of defense counsel’s participation in the
process.1
—Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority in Missouri v. Frye
INTRODUCTION
Virtually every criminal conviction in the United States is concluded through
plea bargaining.2 Yet the Supreme Court, in the companion cases of Lafler v.
Cooper3 and Missouri v. Frye,4 has only recently begun to look more critically at
plea bargaining to ensure that defendants’ constitutional rights are protected in the
process.5 However, as Frye illustrates, the Court has declined to examine what
constitutes competent negotiation in plea bargains by dismissing analysis of the
negotiation process itself as a question of “personal style” for which standards
cannot be set.6 Instead, the Court has only examined effective assistance of
counsel claims in one phase of plea bargaining: the client counseling phase.7 The
Court’s reluctance to more fully examine competent assistance of counsel during
all phases of plea bargaining, not simply the client counseling phase, reflects the
* Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. Thank you to Professors Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Peter Reilly, Lisa Rich, Jenny Roberts, Andrea Schneider, Jenia Iontcheva Turner, and Ron Wright for their
assistance at different stages of drafting this article. Thank you for the valuable feedback to the participants at the
AALS Criminal Law Works-in-Progress Conference in January 2014, the Texas A&M Faculty Workshop in April
2014, and the AALS Dispute Resolution Works-in Progress Conference at Southwestern University Law School
in November 2014. Thank you to my research assistants: Kristinia Anderson, Shawn Johnson, Chelsea
Mikulencak, and Ben Nystrom. Finally, thank you to the Texas A&M University School of Law for financial
assistance towards the completion of this article. © 2016, Cynthia Alkon.
1. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (emphasis added).
2. See id. at 1407 (“Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions
are the result of guilty pleas.”). This is not a new development. Since at least the middle of the twentieth century
only a small percentage of criminal cases have been resolved through trial. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing
Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
459, 495 (2004).
3. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
4. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1399.
5. As will be discussed below in Section III, the Supreme Court’s more critical view of plea bargaining
arguably started with Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
6. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408.
7. See Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2653 (2013).
377
Court’s failure to consider developments in the field of negotiation over the last
thirty years.
Negotiation scholars and practitioners have moved far beyond defining bargain-
ing simply by “personal style.” Instead, they view negotiation as a skill that can be
taught and analyzed, and one for which basic standards of competency have been
established.8 Negotiation scholars recognize that there are a variety of phases in
every negotiation.9 Plea bargaining is the negotiation of a criminal case and
therefore includes the three basic phases in any lawyer-assisted negotiation: the
preparation phase, the negotiation phase, and the client counseling phase. For
example, the preparation phase can include the first client interview, investigating
the case, gathering information, doing legal research, and preparing the client for
either involvement in the negotiation, or for what the possible options are as
outcomes from the negotiation.10 The next phase is the negotiation phase, which
includes discussions between the prosecution and the defense on the offers and
counter-offers and may start and conclude on different days.11 The negotiation
phase is connected to the preparation phase as lawyers who fail to properly prepare
for the negotiation may also fail to competently negotiate.12 For example, a lawyer
who fails to conduct a basic interview with their client may be unaware of a strong
defense to the charges or of a possible motion, such as a motion to suppress
evidence. If a lawyer is unaware of possible defenses and motions, the lawyer may
fail to use that information as leverage to negotiate a better offer from the
prosecution. The final stage of plea bargaining is counseling the client regarding
whether to accept the offer.13 This is the only phase of plea bargaining for which
8. See, e.g., ASSESSING OUR STUDENTS, ASSESSING OURSELVES (Noam Ebner, James Coben & Christopher
Honeyman eds., 2012); VENTURING BEYOND THE CLASSROOM (Christopher Honeyman, James Coben & Giuseppe
De Palo eds., 2010); RETHINKING NEGOTIATION TEACHING: INNOVATIONS FOR CONTEXT AND CULTURE (Christopher
Honeyman, James Coben & Giuseppe De Palo eds., 2009) [hereinafter RETHINKING NEGOTIATION TEACHING].
9. See, e.g., John Lande, Teaching Students to Negotiate Like a Lawyer, 39 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109, 128–29
(2012). For a multi-disciplinary explanation of different negotiation stages in different types of negotiations
beyond legal disputes, see I. William Zartman, Process and Stages, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 95–98
(Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006).
10. For just one example of how to prepare to negotiate, see generally ROGER FISHER & DANNY ERTEL, GETTING
READY TO NEGOTIATE: THE GETTING TO YES WORKBOOK (1995) (including questions to help negotiators think
through what information they have and what information they may need to decide how to approach the
negotiation).
11. For a more detailed description of plea negotiation, see Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure
to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 594–614 (2014).
12. See, e.g., JILL PAPERNO, REPRESENTING THE ACCUSED: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CRIMINAL DEFENSE 216–22
(2012) (describing preparation as “Getting Ready to Rumble” and listing information that a defense lawyer needs
to know “[t]o effectively negotiate a disposition”). For a discussion of preparation in the context of prevailing
professional norms, see Roberts, supra note 7, at 2665–69. For a list of what defense counsel should do to develop
an overall “negotiation plan,” see NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION § 6.2 (2010) [hereinafter NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES].
13. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 2653 (“The case holdings thus all relate to an individual’s right to information
and counseling about a plea offer or guilty plea . . . . They regulate only the conversation between defense counsel
and the client.”).
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the Supreme Court has started to define basic standards of competency. In three
separate cases, the Court has held that basic competency requires lawyers to advise
their clients of an offer,14 give competent advice about whether the facts are a
violation of the law,15 and to advise about collateral immigration consequences of
accepting a guilty plea.16
This Article will propose standards that the Court could use to define compe-
tency in each of the three stages of plea bargaining.17 This Article will focus on
base-line competency, rather than excellence, as competency is the standard the
Court uses in determining whether a defendant has been denied his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.18 This Article will first
describe in Section I how the Court, in Lafler and Frye, has limited its view of the
right to competent assistance of counsel to only the counseling phase of the plea
bargaining process. Section II will then explain the Court’s definition of competent
assistance of counsel generally, and consider how the Court can use its existing
standards to define competency in all three phases of plea bargaining. Section III
will discuss how the field of negotiation views negotiation styles as simply a
negotiation skill, not as a singular defining feature of negotiation defying analy-
sis.19 Section IV will explain the phases of plea bargaining and suggest basic
standards for competency in each phase.20 This Article concludes that the Court
must look beyond the counseling phase and should not shy away from defining
competence in all three phases of plea bargaining. It is not only possible for the
Court to define basic competency in the preparation and negotiation phases of plea
bargaining, but it is also imperative that the Court do so to meaningfully protect
defendants’ constitutional right to counsel during plea bargaining.21
14. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012).
15. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012).
16. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364–66 (2010).
17. However, as I have written elsewhere, Lafler and Frye fail to address the serious and systemic problems in
plea bargaining. This Article is intended to help better define competent assistance of counsel in plea bargaining,
while still recognizing that other areas need to be addressed to make plea bargaining a fair process that respects
the rights of defendants. For a longer discussion of the systemic issues impacting plea bargaining, see generally
Alkon, supra note 11.
18. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
19. See, e.g., Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Negotiation Barometry: A Dynamic
Measure of Conflict Management Style, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 557 (2013); Andrea Kupfer Schneider,
Teaching a New Negotiation Skills Paradigm, 39 WASH. U. J. OF LAW & POL’Y 13 (2012).
20. See Rishi Batra, Lafler and Frye: A New Constitutional Standard for Negotiation, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 309, 309–10 (2013) (arguing that the Court has “effectively created a negotiation competency bar for
criminal defense lawyers”).
21. “[I]t is hard to conceive of a role for counsel that does not include effective negotiation.” Roberts, supra
note 7, at 2659.
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I. LAFLER AND FRYE
In 2012, in the companion cases of Lafler22 and Frye,23 the United States
Supreme Court held that there is a right to effective assistance of counsel during
plea bargaining.24 In Frye, the defendant’s lawyer failed to convey a plea offer to
the defendant before it expired.25 As a result, the defendant pled guilty to a felony
of driving with a revoked license and was sentenced to three years in custody,
instead of taking the original misdemeanor offer.26 In Lafler, the defendant was
charged with four counts including assault with intent to commit murder.27 The
victim was shot a total of four times in the hip, buttock, and abdomen.28 The
defendant’s lawyer in this case did convey the offer, but did so with extraordinarily
bad advice, telling his client that the prosecution “would be unable to establish his
intent to murder” because the victim was shot below the waist.29 This was so
clearly wrong that the parties on appeal agreed that the advice fell below the
required “objective standard of reasonableness.”30 Based on this poor advice, the
defendant turned down a plea deal that was over one-third less than his eventual
sentence.31 There were no errors in the trial itself, but the Court concluded that the
trial did not cure whatever problems may have occurred during the plea bargaining
process and specifically said that “[e]ven if the trial itself is free from constitu-
tional flaw, the defendant who goes to trial instead of taking a more favorable plea
may be prejudiced from either a conviction on more serious counts or the
imposition of a more severe sentence.”32
As I have said before, these cases are both textbook examples of bad lawyering,
and as such, the Court did not articulate a new standard for competence or effective
assistance of counsel.33 Instead, it simply acknowledged that the already existing
professional standard should apply during the plea bargaining stage.34 Both cases
were examples of bad lawyering in the counseling phase of plea bargaining, and
22. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
23. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
24. For a more detailed description of these cases, see Alkon, supra note 11, at 573–76; see also Roberts, supra
note 7, at 2656–65.
25. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404.
26. See id. at 1404–05. The facts are also complicated by the defendant picking up a new case after the offer
expired and before he pled guilty.
27. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 1384 (“In this case all parties agree the performance of respondent’s counsel was deficient when
he advised respondent to reject the plea offer on the grounds he could not be convicted at trial. In light of this
concession, it is unnecessary for this Court to explore the issue.”).
31. See id. at 1383–84. He rejected an offer of 51–85 months in prison (4.25–7.08 years) and was sentenced to
185–360 months in prison (15.4–30 years) after the jury convicted him at trial.
32. Id. at 1386.
33. See Alkon, supra note 11, at 573.
34. See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law After Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 595, 610–13
(2013).
380 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:377
the Court focused entirely on what the lawyer did or did not do with his client (i.e.,
convey the offer, give accurate advice about the law, and advise on whether to take
the plea deal).35 The Court did not examine the plea negotiation process itself, but
rather limited its analysis to the client counseling phase during plea bargaining.
However, the Court did recognize the importance of plea bargaining and
explicitly stated, for the first time, that “criminal justice today is for the most part a
system of pleas, not a system of trials.”36 Through these decisions the Court is
moving beyond viewing trials as the “touchstone” in criminal cases.37 The Court
also moved beyond viewing trials as the cure to any problems in plea bargaining as
it is “insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that
inoculates any errors in the pretrial process.”38 The Court went on to state that “the
negotiation of a plea bargain . . . is almost always the critical point for a defen-
dant.”39 These statements indicate that the Court could look more critically and
expansively at plea bargaining as a whole in future cases.40
II. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
It is important to understand the case law that precedes Lafler and Frye to
understand how the Court could move beyond only defining competence in the
client counseling phase of plea bargaining. The foundational case to determine
effective assistance of counsel is Strickland v. Washington.41 As will be discussed
below, the Court in Strickland established a two-prong test that it later used in
Lafler and Frye to determine whether a defendant has been deprived of effective
assistance of counsel.42 After discussing the case law, this Section will next discuss
the ABA Standards, as the Court looks to the ABA Standards in deciding whether a
lawyer has met the first prong of the Strickland standard.43
35. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 2656–65.
36. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
37. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer
Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1122 (2011) (“The most notable feature of the pre-Padilla landscape is that
trials remained the norm, the touchstone guiding the Court.”).
38. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
39. Id.
40. Justice Scalia expresses just this concern in his dissents, stating that these decisions will mark the
beginning of a “new boutique of constitutional jurisprudence,” Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting),
and lead to “cases galore” going up on appeal. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
42. See id. at 668, 693–94.
43. See Gary Feldon & Tara Beech, Unpacking the First Prong of the Strickland Standard: How to Identify
Controlling Precedent and Determine Prevailing Professional Norms in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cases,
23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12 (2012).
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A. Strickland v. Washington
In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Strickland v. Washington44 that a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel required that the lawyer be
effective, and that this right was violated if (1) a lawyer’s performance fell below
an “objective standard of reasonableness,”45 and (2) the defendant showed that but
for the lawyer’s performance, the case result would be different.46 Strickland was a
death penalty case and the Court stated that the “purpose” of the Sixth Amendment
right to effective counsel was “to ensure a fair trial.”47 The Court went on to say
that “[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether
counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”48
The Court applied the Strickland two-prong test to plea bargaining in earlier
cases,49 but it was not until the 2010 case of Padilla v. Kentucky that the Court held
that a defense lawyer had violated the Strickland standards during plea bargain-
ing.50 In Padilla, the lawyer failed to advise the defendant about the immigration
consequences of his guilty plea.51 The Court concluded that “[t]he weight of
prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her
client regarding the risk of deportation.”52
In Lafler and Frye, the Court found that defense lawyers had failed to meet the
Strickland standard during the plea bargaining phase. In Frye, the Court explained
that the first prong had been met as the defendant’s lawyer had failed to perform at
an objectively reasonable level.53 In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked to
the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Pleas of Guilty.54 In Lafler, the Court
explained how the second prong—that but for the performance of the lawyer, the
result would have been different—can be established in the context of plea
bargaining.55 A defendant “must show the outcome of the plea process would have
44. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88.
45. Id. at 688.
46. See id. at 691–96.
47. Id. at 686.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57–58 (1985) (“We hold, therefore, that the two-part Strickland v.
Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
50. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (“[C]onstitutionally competent counsel would have
advised [Padilla] that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to automatic deportation. Whether he
is entitled to relief depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a matter that we do not address.”).
51. See id. at 359.
52. Id. at 367.
53. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408–09 (2012).
54. See id. at 1408 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14-3.2(a) (3d ed. 1999),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/pleas_guilty.authcheckdam.
pdf [hereinafter ABA GUILTY PLEA STANDARDS]).
55. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384–85 (2012).
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been different with competent advice.”56 In both Lafler and Frye, the Court
referred to Hill v. Lockhart, a case in which the defendant alleged incompetent
assistance of counsel because his lawyer told him that if he pled guilty, he would be
eligible for parole before he was, in fact, eligible for parole.57 The Court found that
the defendant failed to establish that but for the incorrect advice the defendant
would not have taken the plea deal.58 In Hill, as in Lafler, Frye, and Padilla, the
Court examined the question of whether the lawyer was competent solely during
the counseling phase of the plea bargain.59
Starting with Strickland in 1984, the Court was clear that it would not be too
critical of defense lawyers as “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be
highly deferential.”60 The Court went on to say that “a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.”61 Then, the Court established the hurdle that the defen-
dant must overcome—that is, the presumption that the lawyer was engaging in
“sound trial strategy.”62 The Court also explained that these strategic choices
should be “respected”63 because “advocacy is an art and not a science.”64
Due to the Court favoring “deference,” the Strickland standard is not easy for
defendants to meet.65 Justice Stevens acknowledged this when he wrote in Padilla
that “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.”66 The Court has
only found ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland two-prong test
during the counseling phase of the plea bargaining process.67 However, Padilla,
Lafler, and Frye open the door for the Court to look more critically at defense
counsels’ conduct during plea bargaining beyond the counseling phase.
B. The ABA Standards
The Court refers to ABA standards in examining whether a defense lawyer
fulfilled the first prong of Strickland in that their assistance met an “objective
standard of reasonableness.”68 For this reason, it is important to understand what
56. Id. at 1384.
57. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1985).
58. See id. at 60.
59. See id. (“In the present case the claimed error of counsel is erroneous advice as to eligibility for parole
under the sentence agreed to in the plea bargain.”).
60. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–89 (1984).
61. Id. at 689.
62. See id.; see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 191 (2011) (considering the question of trial strategy
under Strickland); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 108 (2011) (same).
63. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681.
64. Id.
65. For a more detailed analysis of Strickland, see generally Feldon & Beech, supra note 43.
66. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
67. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384–85 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408–09 (2012);
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360.
68. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 367.
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the ABA considers professional standards in plea bargaining.69
The ABA Guilty Plea Standards list six specific “[r]esponsibilities of defense
counsel.”70 The first is the standard that Frye held was violated: defense lawyers
should advise the defendant of “developments” in plea discussions and “promptly
communicate and explain . . . all plea offers made by the prosecuting attorney.”71
The second requires that “after appropriate investigation,” defense lawyers should
“advise the defendant of the alternatives available.”72 This standard clearly states
that: “Defense counsel should not recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea
unless appropriate investigation and study of the case has been completed.”73 The
third standard is that the defendant must consent to the plea deal, and the defendant
must have the ultimate authority to decide whether to accept the deal or not.74 The
fourth states that defense counsel should not “knowingly” misstate facts or the law
in the plea discussions with the prosecuting attorney.75 The fifth requires defense
counsel to “explore the possibility of a diversion of the case from the criminal
process.”76 Finally, the sixth standard requires defense counsel to advise the
defendant about collateral consequences from a guilty plea.77
The ABA Guilty Plea Standards offer little direction to the Court in determining
what is competent assistance of counsel during each of the three phases of plea
bargaining. Most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, the Standards fail
to provide any meaningful guidance regarding competent assistance of counsel
during the negotiation phase itself. The standards instead focus more on the
counseling phase of plea bargaining, as three of the six standards refer exclusively
to this phase.78 Two of the standards refer to preparation before negotiation.79 Only
one of the six standards exclusively refers to the negotiation phase of a plea
bargain.80 However, that standard offers little direction regarding appropriate or
required conduct during plea negotiations beyond the already clear ethical guide-
line: that a defense lawyer (and prosecutor) should not misstate facts or the law.81
One of the six standards, the requirement to “explore the possibility of diversion,”
could arguably also refer to the negotiation phase as it suggests a requirement that
69. Although some early cases (before 2000) seemed to suggest otherwise, the Court is now clear that it looks
to the ABA Standards as a guide and does not consider them to be definitive tests. See Feldon & Beech, supra note
43, at 12 (citing Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 11, 12 (2009)).
70. ABA GUILTY PLEA STANDARDS, supra note 54, § 14-3.2(a)–(f).
71. Id. § 14-3.2(a).
72. Id. § 14-3.2(b).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 14-3.2(c).
75. Id. § 14-3.2(d).
76. Id. § 14-3.2(e).
77. Id. § 14-3.2(f).
78. See id. § 14-3.2(a), (c), (f).
79. See id. § 14-3.2(b), (e).
80. See id. § 14-3.2(d).
81. See id. § 14-3.1(f) (the prosecutor’s responsibilities); id. § 14-3.2(d) (the defense counsel’s responsibilities).
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defense lawyers request diversion in plea negotiations if the defendant and the case
are eligible.82 However, “exploring the possibility of diversion” also includes the
preparation phase, as the defense lawyer may need to investigate whether the
defendant qualifies.
The ABA has also developed Defense Function Standards.83 These standards go
into more depth regarding what defense lawyers should do, and, as such, provide
additional and better guidance regarding competent assistance of counsel in plea
bargaining. The Defense Function Standards require that the defense lawyer
should “determine all relevant facts known to the accused” as soon as is possible.84
As with the Guilty Plea Standards, the Defense Function Standards clearly state
that defense counsel has a duty to investigate.85 The Defense Function Standards
go further and specifically state that defense lawyers’ “duty to investigate exists
regardless of the accused’s admissions . . . or the accused’s stated desire to plead
guilty.”86 This duty also requires “efforts to secure information in the possession of
the prosecution and law enforcement authorities.”87 The phrasing of this duty
reflects an understanding that actually getting discovery may not always be
possible, particularly in jurisdictions that do not have open file discovery or other
rules that require such disclosure.88
The Defense Function Standards also go into more depth about the counseling
process. These Standards require that lawyers inform themselves “fully on the
facts and the law” before advising their client about the case.89 The commentary
states that lawyers should not only “inform the defendant of the maximum and
minimum sentences,” but also “be aware of the actual sentencing practices of the
court.”90 Under this standard, defense lawyers need to know not only the strength
of the prosecution case, but also the sentencing practices in the particular court.91
For example, do judges in this jurisdiction give higher sentences after trial? Do
judges follow pre-sentencing report recommendations? Are there mandatory
minimums associated with the charges? Defense lawyers are also to give “a candid
82. See id. § 14-3.2(e).
83. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 4-3.1–4-
8.6 (1993), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/prosecution_
defense_function.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2015) [hereinafter ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS].
This Article only discusses the Third Edition of the ABA Defense Function Standards, as the Fourth Edition,
while approved by the ABA House of Delegates at the mid-year meeting in 2015, had not been published with
commentary at the time this Article went to print.
84. Id. § 4-3.2(a), at 152.
85. See id. § 4-4.1(a), at 181.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. For a more detailed discussion of the continuing failure of the U.S. Supreme Court to recognize the need
for discovery in plea bargaining, see generally Cynthia Alkon, The Right to Defense Discovery in Plea Bargaining
Fifty Years After Brady v. Maryland, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 407 (2014).
89. ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 83, § 4-5.1(a), at 197.
90. Id. at 198.
91. Id.
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estimate of the probable outcome” of the case.92 As with the Guilty Plea Standards,
the Defense Function Standards require defense counsel to communicate offers93
and advise the defendant about any plea discussions.94
The Defense Function Standards, as with the Guilty Pleas Standards, require
lawyers to explore diversion.95 At the time these standards were written, problem
solving courts—including drug courts, mental health courts, and veterans’ courts—
were either recently established (drug courts) or not yet in existence.96 It seems
that this standard would apply to these types of courts, and that an objectively
reasonable standard of care for lawyers is that they should know the variety of
options that might be available—including alternative sentencing or diversion
from prosecution.
III. DOES STYLE DEFINE NEGOTIATION?
Although the Court views negotiation as simply “personal style,”97 negotiation
scholars agree that negotiation is a skill that lawyers both need to, and can, learn
how to do better.98 Negotiation scholarship, starting with the classic book Getting
to Yes,99 is premised on the idea that negotiation is a skill and that people can
improve their negotiation skills.100 Negotiation scholars in law, and in other fields,
have moved beyond the concept that negotiation is simply an art form or that being
a good negotiator is an inherent personality trait that cannot be analyzed, studied,
or taught.101 In the thirty or so years since negotiation became a recognized field,
92. Id. § 4-5.1(a), at 197.
93. See id. § 4-6.2(b), at 206.
94. See id. § 4-6.2(a), at 206.
95. See id. § 4-6.1(a), at 203.
96. The first drug court started in 1989 in Florida. Ten years later, in 1999, there were 492 such courts. By
2012, there were 2734 drug courts nationwide, including in every state. See Drug Court History, NAT’L ASS’N OF
DRUG COURT PROF’LS, http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/drug-court-history (last visited Nov. 24,
2015).
97. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012).
98. Dispute resolution literature defines negotiation as a “consensual process,” as it requires both sides to agree
to the eventual outcome. See, e.g., LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 16 (4th ed.
2009).
99. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce
Patton ed., 3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter GETTING TO YES].
100. For an early example, see HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982). “There is an art
and a science of negotiation. By ‘science’ I loosely mean systematic analysis for problem solving . . . The ‘art’
side of the ledger . . . includes interpersonal skills, the ability to convince and be convinced, the ability to employ
a basketfull of bargaining ploys, and the wisdom to know when and how to use them.” Id. at 7–8. For more recent
negotiation texts, see CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., NEGOTIATION: PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING (2d ed.
2014); RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY (3d ed. 2014); CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE
LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (6th ed. 2009); LEIGH L. THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE
NEGOTIATOR (3d ed. 2005).
101. There is an ever-expanding literature on how to teach negotiation. For some more recent examples, see
RETHINKING NEGOTIATION TEACHING, supra note 8; Schneider & Brown, supra note 19; Schneider, supra note 19;
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scholars have identified at least six standard canons of negotiation.102 The
negotiation canon includes style, but goes beyond that singular concept to include
six other canons: strategy; personality; communication skills; the development of
concepts about approaches to negotiation, including different types of negotiations
(integrative v. distributive); looking for “bargaining zones;” and preparation for
negotiation.103 Most importantly for this discussion, negotiators and scholars who
study negotiation agree that it is possible to analyze whether a particular negotiator
did a competent, incompetent, or excellent job during the negotiation itself as well
as during the preparation and counseling phase.104
Negotiation courses teach about different negotiation styles and encourage
students to use different styles depending on the circumstances and the goals for a
particular negotiation.105 Negotiation scholars have an ever-increasing number of
labels to describe these styles.106 One common approach is to identify five basic
styles of negotiation: avoiding, compromising, accommodation, competitive, or
collaborative.107 Style is increasingly not considered to be a constant or inherent
trait, but rather is seen as one component of any negotiator’s skill set; and being
able to use a variety of styles to adapt to the particular situation is considered a
mark of strong negotiating skills.108
Early negotiation scholarship discussed the merits of expanding negotiation
beyond a competitive or distributional approach.109 The idea was to describe a
form of negotiation where the negotiators move beyond the positions of the parties
and look instead at the parties’ underlying interests.110 Scholars focused on how to
be more integrative, or problem solving, in negotiation.111 Recent negotiation
scholars have recommended that it is time to move beyond thinking of negotiation
as either integrative or distributive, as those terms often do not capture the variety
Lande, supra note 9. For an earlier example of work in the field discussing how to improve negotiation skills by
the use of more mathematical models, see RAIFFA, supra note 100.
102. See generally Christopher Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Catching up with the Major-General:
Why There’s a Need for a “Canon of Negotiation,” 87 MARQ. L. REV. 637, 640 (2004) (discussing the “ambitious”
initiative of developing a canon of negotiation).
103. See id. at 643–44.
104. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 19, at 27 (offering a description of varying skill levels as “minimum,
average, and best”).
105. See, e.g., CRAVER, supra note 100, at 9–19.
106. For a discussion of the use of labels and the variety of labels describing negotiation from different fields,
see Schneider, supra note 19, at 15–19.
107. See, e.g., G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE
PEOPLE 8–12 (2d ed. 2006). This is also the approach used by the Thomas-Kilman Conflict Mode Instrument.
108. See, e.g., Schneider & Brown, supra note 19, at 557; Schneider, supra note 19, at 23–24.
109. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984). See generally GETTING TO YES, supra note 99.
110. For a more detailed description of positional negotiation, see John Lande, A Framework for Advancing
Negotiation Theory: Implications from a Study of How Lawyers Reach Agreement in Pretrial Litigation, 16
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 18–26 (2014).
111. For a description of how this approach has been integrated into negotiation texts, see id. at 27–28.
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and complexity of what actually goes on in negotiations—particularly negotiations
happening in the shadow of possible litigation.112
Negotiation scholarship has also discussed how to use various styles of
negotiation to a party’s best advantage. Negotiation scholars have conducted
empirical studies to better understand how lawyers negotiate, and to determine if
one style makes for a more effective negotiator as compared to another style.113 In
one study, Andrea Kupfer Schneider studied lawyer negotiating styles and con-
cluded that problem solving negotiation was perceived to be more effective by
lawyers.114 A problem solving lawyer is one who works with their counterparts to
try to satisfy the interests of their clients in a more collaborative and less
adversarial way.115 Problem solving lawyers work to understand the parties’
underlying interests to find solutions that “expand the pie,” rather than merely
divide the pie.116 By contrast, an adversarial negotiator is one who sees negotiation
as a zero sum game and thinks that gains by one side must come at the expense of
the other.117 Schneider also examined what skills effective lawyers use including
tools such as assertiveness and empathy.118 Other studies have tried to measure
how often lawyers use a particular negotiation approach.119 What this expanding
body of empirical scholarship demonstrates is that it is possible to both examine
and analyze how different negotiation styles are used in a negotiation process, and
to draw conclusions about the success of a negotiator based on this analysis.120
Negotiation scholars recommend that it is time to move beyond focusing on
negotiation styles as a singular static element in a negotiation and to move towards
112. See Lande, supra note 110, at 6 (“A major problem in legal negotiation theory is the excessive focus on
the adversarial and cooperative models of negotiation . . . .”).
113. See, e.g., id. at 2 (“[C]ompar[ing] generally-accepted theories of legal negotiation with empirical
accounts of lawyers’ negotiations to illustrate some misconceptions in the theories . . . .”); Andrea Kupfer
Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV 143 (2001).
114. See Schneider, supra note 113, at 148.
115. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 109, at 794–801 (“[F]ocuses on finding solutions to the parties’ sets of
underlying needs and objectives.”).
116. Consider that:
By attempting to uncover those underlying needs, the problem-solving model presents opportuni-
ties for discovering greater numbers of and better quality solutions. It offers the possibility of
meeting a greater variety of needs both directly and by trading off different needs, rather than
forcing a zero-sum battle over a single item.
Id. at 795.
117. See id. at 764–65 (“It is assumed that the parties must be in conflict and since they are presumed to be
bargaining for the same ‘scarce’ items, negotiators assume that any solution is predicated upon division of the
goods.”); see also id. at 783–89 (describing the underlying assumptions of the adversarial model).
118. See Schneider, supra note 113, at 147.
119. See, e.g., Milton Heumann & Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation Methods and Litigation Settlement
Methods in New Jersey: “You Can’t Always Get What You Want,” 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 253 (1997)
(analyzing negotiation and settlement approaches employed by civil litigators in New Jersey).
120. See Lande, supra note 110, at 46–49 (discussing a “framework for analyzing negotiation”).
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focusing on skills. Andrea Kupfer Schneider and Jennifer Brown have developed
an instrument to help negotiators evaluate what negotiation style they use at
different points during a negotiation.121 This instrument recognizes that a negotia-
tion is rarely a singular event and that negotiators therefore use multiple styles
during a negotiation.122 As Schneider and Brown say, “[m]any negotiators find that
they shift—they change their styles in one way or another—to adjust to the rising
temperature of the conflict.”123 Schneider recommends that negotiation professors
stop using style as the focus for analysis and advocates using particular skills that
cut across various negotiating styles. These skills include: assertiveness, empathy,
flexibility, social intuition, and ethicality.124 Schneider recommends that negotia-
tion students analyze whether they have reached a level of “minimum, average, or
best” practices for each skill.125 In doing so, Schneider recommends against
teaching that style is the “key choice” the student must make in advance of the
negotiation.126 Instead, Schneider recommends that professors focus on teaching
students how to be more effective with each skill.127
This expanding body of literature takes a more nuanced view of negotiation than
Justice Kennedy expresses in Frye.128 While negotiation scholars recognize that
style matters—unlike Justice Kennedy—the negotiation literature does not view
style as a singular defining feature or one that is beyond analysis or criticism.
Therefore, it is possible to critically analyze the negotiation process itself, looking
at a variety of skills used by the negotiators. Style, when viewed correctly, is
simply another negotiation skill. As the field of negotiation has developed, so too
has a common understanding of what a competent negotiator should do during
each phase of a negotiation. These common understandings inform the suggestions
discussed in the following Section regarding what constitutes basic competency of
a lawyer during the three phases of plea bargaining.
IV. THE THREE PHASES OF PLEA BARGAINING
Every lawyer-assisted negotiation has at least three phases: the preparation
phase, the negotiation phase, and the counseling phase. For the purposes of this
Article, each phase will be discussed as a distinct part of the process; however, it
should be recognized that these phases are often interconnected and may happen
121. See Schneider & Brown, supra note 19, at 557–58.
122. Id. at 575.
123. Id.
124. See Schneider, supra note 19, at 28–35.
125. See id. at 27.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 24–37.
128. Justice Kennedy is not alone in this, as practicing lawyers also fail to recognize that negotiation is a skill
that can be taught. As a result, training for criminal defense lawyers more often focuses on trial skills, and more
infrequently on negotiation skills. See Jenny Roberts & Ronald F. Wright, Training for Bargaining, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id2651396.
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simultaneously, rather than in the linear fashion this discussion might suggest. For
example, the preparation phase includes client interviewing, which may—as more
information becomes available—also happen in other phases. The following
discussion is not intended to fully explain the possible complexity of the plea
bargaining process itself, nor is it meant to investigate every possible permutation
of plea negotiations.129 Rather, it is intended to suggest minimum bright-line
standards of competence for each phase of a plea negotiation.
A. The Preparation Phase of Plea Bargaining
The first phase of plea bargaining is to prepare for the negotiation.130 For
criminal cases, basic competency requires that the lawyer understand the facts of
the case, any possible defenses, any possible pre-trial motions, and the possible
maximum punishment for a particular client.131 Acquiring this understanding is
basic preparation both for trial and for negotiating a plea bargain.132
A defense lawyer should always do this basic preparation, although competent
preparation is not always time consuming. If a case is factually simple—for
example, a misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol case—it is possible
for a competent defense lawyer to complete preparation through an initial
interview with the client, verifying lab results, and reading the police report.133
129. For more in-depth studies of plea bargaining, see AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS
COURT (2010); MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL
COURT (1992); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS (1978); ARTHUR ROSETT & DONALD R. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINS IN THE
AMERICAN COURTHOUSE (1976). For historic views of how plea bargaining has grown in the United States and how
it worked in earlier eras, see MARY E. VOGEL, COERCION TO COMPROMISE: PLEA BARGAINING, THE COURTS, AND THE
MAKING OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY (2007); GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003).
130. For an article recommending that poor preparation for negotiating a plea bargain should give rise to an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, see Batra, supra note 20, at 326–27.
131. See, e.g., Vida B. Johnson, Effective Assistance of Counsel and Guilty Pleas—Seven Rules to Follow, 37
THE CHAMPION 24 (2013); see also NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 12, §§ 6.1–6.2; ABA GUILTY
PLEA STANDARDS, supra note 54, § 14-3.2(b) (“Defense Counsel should not recommend to a defendant acceptance
of a plea unless appropriate investigation and study of the case has been completed.”). For a discussion of
preparing for negotiation focused on civil cases, see CRAVER, supra note 100, at 46–54.
132. For a list of questions a defense lawyer should consider asking at the first interview with their new client,
see PAPERNO, supra note 12, at 73–79. Another reason that preparation for negotiation and trial demand the same
information is that they are not separate and distinct processes. As Marc Galanter observed, in coining the term
“litigotiation,” “[t]here are not two distinct processes, negotiation and litigation; there is a single process of
disputing in the vicinity of official tribunals.” Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach about
Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984). For an empirical study of plea bargaining that reached this
same conclusion, see Debra S. Emmelman, Trial by Plea Bargain: Case Settlement As a Product of Recursive
Decisionmaking, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 335, 336 (1996) (“[P]lea bargaining can be seen to encompass not only
multiple episodes of negotiating behavior but also a wide range of formal litigation proceedings. As such
distinctions made between plea bargaining and taking a case to trial can actually be seen as relatively minor.”).
133. Not waiting for lab results before entering a guilty plea can create a serious problem if the lab results do
not support the criminal charge. For example, the District Attorney in Houston Texas (Harris County) recently
reported that “hundreds” of defendants pled guilty to drug crimes when test results later came in stating that the
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The reality is that a large number of criminal cases begin and end on the day of
arraignment.134 Pleading a case out at arraignment can reflect highly competent
counsel and representation. The question is not how quickly the case was resolved,
but rather whether the lawyer did what is required to competently represent the
defendant.135 As will be discussed below, not every case needs to be investigated
beyond interviewing the client and reviewing discovery from the prosecution, and
there can be good reasons to take a plea deal on the first court appearance.136
There are three basic questions that a defense lawyer needs to answer during the
negotiation preparation phase.137 First, the lawyer should determine if there are
any possible defenses to the charge. Second, the lawyer should determine whether
there are any possible pre-trial motions. Third, a competent defense lawyer should
take basic steps to determine if there are possible additional charges or sentencing
enhancements. The first two areas are directly relevant to the negotiation process
itself as a defense or pre-trial motion can be used as leverage to persuade the
prosecutor to make a better offer.138 The third area is most relevant to the defense
in the counseling phase as it is crucial information to know when counseling a
client about whether they should accept the plea offer or not. If a defense lawyer
discovers that there are possible additional charges or enhancements that the
prosecutor—for whatever reason—has not yet added, it might be a reason to
item was not, in fact, an illegal substance. Michael Barajas, Lab Reports Show Hundreds “Convicted in Error” for
Drug Offenses, HOUSTON PRESS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://blogs.houstonpress.com/news/2014/10/lab_reports_show_
hundreds_convicted_in_error_for_drug_offenses.php.
134. See, e.g., Nancy Albert-Goldberg, Los Angeles County Public Defender Office in Perspective, 45 CAL.
W. L. REV. 445, 461, 466 (2009).
135. This question is the same whether it is a misdemeanor or felony case as both carry significant
consequences. See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 287 (2011) (“Two ways in which the quality of misdemeanor
representation matters more today than ever before merit particular attention: the proliferation of criminal records
and the related phenomenon of an explosion in collateral consequences for minor criminal convictions.”).
136. See Alkon, supra note 11, at 598–601 (discussing how defendants may find court appearances more of a
burden than a benefit, and how this can reinforce already existing power imbalances in the criminal justice
system).
137. For a discussion on the importance of information gathering in negotiation, consider:
[I]nformation is the lifeblood of any negotiation, and at its core, negotiation is about protecting
sensitive information of one’s own (to prevent oneself from being exploited) while extracting
information from other parties. Good negotiators must therefore learn how to conduct extensive
background research, to engage aggressively and relentlessly in asking questions and digging for
answers, and to take other proactive steps to unearth or extract the most (and most accurate)
information possible from all parties at the table.
Peter Reilly, Was Machiavelli Right? Lying in Negotiation and the Art of Defensive Self-Help, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 481, 533 (2009).
138. For a discussion of persuasion in the context of civil cases, see Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of
Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1799 (2000) (“Perhaps the most common activity negotiators engage in at
the bargaining table is attempting to persuade their opponent of the value of the negotiation’s subject matter or of
other alternatives. The arguments advanced often appear remarkably similar to those that litigating parties might
make to a judge or jury.”).
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counsel a defendant to accept a plea deal while the deal is still available, assuming
it is better than what would be expected after the prosecution discovers the
additional charges and enhancements. The concern would be for the defense to
accept the current plea offer before the prosecutor revokes it or makes a worse deal
due to the added charge or enhancement.
1. Possible Defenses
Defense lawyers have three basic methods they should use to determine if there
is a possible defense to the charges: request discovery, interview their client, and
investigate the case. Basic competence requires a defense lawyer to use these
methods to try to discover facts in a case that could form a defense—and therefore
be useful—during the negotiation process.139 Beyond the important question of
actual innocence,140 failing to discover a possible defense matters in the context of
plea bargaining. Not every case with a strong defense goes to trial. Often, that
defense is instead used as leverage in the plea negotiation.141 This applies equally
to more serious and less serious cases. In a crowded court system, the mere
suggestion of putting a case over to another date or taking it to trial can be enough
leverage to nudge the prosecutor towards a better deal.142
Due to caseload pressures and court crowding, the best time to raise a possible
defense to get a better deal is usually early in the case, and often the earlier the
better.143 The question for the Court to consider is not whether the information that
could constitute a defense would likely change the trial outcome, but rather
139. See ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 83, § 4-3.2(a), at 152. The Commentary to this
section states, “[t]he lawyer needs to know essential facts . . . . The lawyer who is ignorant of the facts of the case
cannot serve the client effectively.” Id. at 152. Essential facts include any possible defense.
140. See Alkon, supra note 11, at 601–03 (discussing how the negotiation atmosphere in plea bargaining can
put pressure on innocent people to plead guilty); see also John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated:
Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (2014) (discussing the circum-
stances in which innocent defendants plead guilty to obtain release).
141. See, e.g., G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 61–62 (3d ed. 2012) (“Factual and legal leverage
points are the strong and weak aspects of the case . . . .”).
142. However, not every defense offered is one that can be useful in the plea negotiation process. A defense
that is supported only by the defendant’s statements is usually insufficient to convince a prosecutor to reduce the
offer. Typical examples are those cases where the defendant claims the police lied or planted evidence. “The
police officer lied” is not an easy defense to use at trial. Juries are often skeptical of the defendant’s version of
events in the absence of any supporting evidence. Under these circumstances, a defendant may decide to go ahead
and take the plea offer because of concerns that they will lose the case at trial and face more time in prison.
However, if the defense is written in the lawyer’s file, it is possible that this could help if the case is later reviewed.
This happened with a number of cases caught up in the Rampart Scandal in Los Angeles, including one case that I
handled during that time when I was a public defender in Los Angeles in the late 1990s. Simple statements in the
defense files that the “defendant denied the drugs were his” were often enough to withdraw guilty pleas and get
cases dismissed. For a longer discussion of the Rampart case and the innocent defendants who pled guilty, see
Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1133 (2013). In total,
156 felony convictions were overturned or dismissed. Id. at 1138.
143. See Johnson, supra note 131, at 25.
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whether it would likely change the negotiation outcome.144
a. Request Discovery
Defense lawyers should seek discovery from the prosecution in each case to
determine if there are any possible defenses.145 This includes asking for the police
report, any witness statements, and any lab results. This is easier in jurisdictions
with open-file discovery.146 The key question for a court to examine here is
whether the defense lawyer requested discovery, not whether the prosecution
actually provided it. However, in some jurisdictions it is possible that simply
requesting discovery raises a tactical question—if, for example, the prosecution
threatens to withdraw any plea offers when the defense requests discovery.147 That
kind of prosecutorial behavior raises other serious constitutional questions.148 But,
for the purposes of determining whether the defense lawyer acted competently, the
issue is whether they asked for discovery, or had a legitimate reason for not
requesting discovery.149
b. Interview the Client
Defense lawyers should not rely only on prosecution discovery, but should also
ask questions to determine whether there is a possible defense during the initial
client interview.150 Implicit in this discussion is the basic requirement that lawyers
actually interview their clients before a case is resolved through plea bargain-
144. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1386 (2012) (“Even if the trial itself is free from constitutional flaw,
the defendant who goes to trial instead of taking a more favorable plea may be prejudiced from either a conviction
on more serious counts or the imposition of a more severe sentence.”). Consider also that:
If a plea bargain has been offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in
considering whether to accept it. If that right is denied, prejudice can be shown if loss of the plea
opportunity led to a trial resulting in a conviction on more serious charges or the imposition of a
more severe sentence.
Id. at 1387.
145. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 2671. However, in the absence of open-file discovery, seeking discovery
may not mean that defense lawyers actually get discovery. See Alkon, supra note 88, at 409–15, 418–21.
146. See, e.g., Alkon, supra note 88, at 418–21.
147. See, e.g., Robert Guest, Michael Morton Act Becomes Law—No More Closed Files in Texas, DALLAS
CRIM. DEF. LAWYER BLOG (May 16, 2013), http:///www.dallascriminaldefenselawyerblog.com/2013/05/michael-
morton-act-becomes-law-no-more-closed-files-in-texas.html.
148. For example, the prosecution has a constitutional duty to turn over any exculpatory evidence to the
defense. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
149. This is not to suggest that the court should not also take a critical look at prosecutorial behavior in plea
bargaining and better define what is acceptable. For a discussion of the ethics issues when prosecutors offer better
deals to weaker cases instead of dismissing them, see RICHARD L. LIPPKE, THE ETHICS OF PLEA BARGAINING
191–216 (2011).
150. See, e.g., ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 83, § 4-3.2(a), at 152; NLADA PERFORMANCE
GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 2.2.
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ing.151 Failing to talk with the client about the case, what he did or did not do, and
any possible defenses is a clear bright line to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel.152
For the average driving under the influence of alcohol or drug possession
charge, the facts are usually fairly straightforward as the criminal charges them-
selves are fairly simple. However, regardless of the seriousness of the case, a
minimally competent defense lawyer should ask basic questions to determine
whether there is a defense. For example, was the defendant actually driving? How
much alcohol did he drink, and what did he eat during that time?153 In a drug
possession case, the question is also very straightforward: did the defendant
actually possess the drugs? Minimal competency requires that the defense lawyer
make a note in their file of the answers to these questions.
It may sound like something that should not need to be spelled out, but when
under pressure to process cases, and with limited funding for defense counsel
services, there are unfortunate (and appalling) examples of lawyers failing to
conduct even a basic client interview.154 For example, in December 2013, the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington at Seattle
found a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because indigent
defense services were so poorly staffed and funded that lawyers engaged in a
“meet and plead” system.155 Lawyers did not have confidential communications
with their clients and failed to ask basic questions about cases and explore whether
there were any possible defenses.156 The District Court expressed concern that
lawyers handling cases in this way may miss a case of actual innocence by failing
to talk to their clients.157 And, equally important, a defense lawyer may miss a
possible defense that should be further investigated to ultimately engage in
meaningful plea bargaining and to provide appropriate advice about whether to
take a case to trial or accept the plea deal.158
151. See ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 83, § 4-3.2(a), at 152 (“As soon as practicable,
defense counsel should seek to determine all relevant facts known to the accused. In so doing, defense counsel
should probe for all legally relevant information . . . .”). One of the key goals of client interviewing is to get
information from the client about the case. See, e.g., ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEW-
ING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 62–65 (1990); STEFAN H. KRIEGER &
RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS: INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, NEGOTIATION, AND
PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS 89–91 (3d ed. 2007).
152. See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1126–27 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (“A failure
of communication precludes the possibility of informed judgment.”).
153. In the Los Angeles County Public Defender’s Office there was a standard list of questions for all driving
under the influence of alcohol cases. Of course, this is not always determinative as defendants often had standard
answers, such as “two beers” when asked how much they drank.
154. See, e.g., Wilbur, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1124–25, 1127.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 1127.
158. See id. at 1127–28.
394 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:377
c. Investigate the Case
Defense lawyers should do appropriate follow-up investigation after discovery
or when new information is provided by their clients.159 The Court has shown a
willingness to hold that the failure to investigate constitutes ineffective assistance
of counsel when lawyers fail to investigate and present mitigation evidence in
death penalty cases.160 Although the Strickland Court cautioned that “reasonable
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation,”161 the Court
went on the say that:
[i]n other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to
make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.
In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be
directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy
measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.162
In examining the duty to investigate in the specific context of plea bargaining, the
Court should focus on three basic questions: (1) was it reasonable to investigate;
(2) did the failure to investigate result in bad advice to the defendant regarding
whether to accept a plea deal or not; and (3) did the failure to investigate result in a
failure to make a counter-offer when there were grounds to do so.163 For example,
if the defendant tells the lawyer that he has an alibi witness, it is reasonable to
expect the lawyer to try to find that witness. If the defendant says that he knows he
had not had enough to drink to be over the legal limit, it is reasonable for the
defense to re-test the blood, or order the maintenance records on the breath
machine.164 The Court should consider such examples of basic investigation when
159. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 2671; see also ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 83,
§ 4-4.1(a), at 181; NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 12, § 4.1(a) (“Counsel has a duty to conduct an
independent investigation regardless of the accused’s admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting
guilt.”); see also, e.g., Ex Parte Briggs, 187 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that it was ineffective
assistance of counsel for a lawyer to recommend that the defendant plead guilty when the attorney had failed to
retain a medical expert to fully investigate the medical records in a felony injury to child case).
160. The Court has held that defense counsel’s failure to investigate possible mitigation evidence in death
penalty cases violates the right to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30
(2009); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
161. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 691 (1984).
162. Id.
163. This can impact a court’s decision regarding whether a decision to recommend accepting or rejecting a
plea deal was “strategic” or merely ill-informed. See Laurence A. Benner, Expanding the Right to Effective
Counsel at Plea Bargaining: Opening Pandora’s Box?, 27 CRIM. JUST. 4, 8–9 (2012).
164. It is good practice for defense lawyers to routinely do both of these things in driving under the influence
cases as part of their standard investigation practices. See, e.g., FLEM K. WHITED, III, DRINKING/DRIVING
LITIGATION CRIMINAL AND CIVIL TRIAL NOTEBOOK §§ 5:8–5:8.1, 5.11 (West 2013) (discussing how to attack the
accuracy of breath machines at trial); Michael S. Taheri & James F. Orr, Litigating a Driving While Intoxicated
Case, 76 AM. JUR. TRIALS 213, at § 65 (2015) (“The likelihood of success when presenting an argument directed at
the accuracy of a test will, in large part, be predicated on the quality of the pretrial investigation and trial
presentation of the client’s theory of defense.”); see also Top DUI Lawyer Mistakes, LAW OFFICE OF JAMES C.
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reviewing a lawyer’s preparation for plea negotiations, and should hold such
preparations to be a fundamental requirement for effective assistance of counsel.165
Related to the requirement that defense lawyers investigate possible defenses to
the underlying charges is the duty to investigate alleged prior convictions or
enhancements.166 For example, if there is an enhancement due to an allegation that
drugs were sold in a “school zone,” it is reasonable to expect the defense lawyer to
verify that the location was in fact a school zone. Defense lawyers should also
investigate any priors that are alleged and that form the basis for increasing the
penalty due to habitual offender statutes. For example, if only felony convictions
count for the particular habitual offender statute, then the defense lawyer should
order the records on the prior to verify that the charge the defendant was convicted
of was actually a felony and was not reduced, for example, to a misdemeanor.
2. Possible Pretrial Motions
The second basic determination a lawyer needs to make to be minimally
competent in the negotiation preparation phase is whether there are possible
pretrial motions, such as a motion to suppress evidence due to an illegal search.167
A minimally competent defense lawyer should always ask basic questions about
the circumstances of the police stop and the search. For example, if the reason for
pulling over the car is a broken taillight, the defense lawyer should confirm that the
taillight was in fact broken.
However, pretrial motions can be difficult for the defense to win. And, in some
courts, the threat of running a pretrial motion can be a reason for the prosecutor to
“pull all plea offers off the table.”168 It is also possible that the threat of a pretrial
motion can act as leverage, particularly if the prosecutor thinks it is well founded,
to get a better plea offer. Therefore, a minimally competent defense lawyer should
know where, when, and how to use the threat of pretrial motions to a client’s
advantage. This is not to suggest that it is ineffective assistance of counsel to
proceed with a pretrial motion even after the prosecution has threatened to increase
FORSLUND, http://colorado-dui.com/parts/lawyermistakes.html (“[A] lawyer should get copies of the various logs,
maintenance records, and the operator’s license or certification.”) (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
165. For examples of cases in the appellate process that have as an issue the defense lawyer’s failure to
investigate, see Ex Parte Harrington, 310 S.W. 3d 452, 458 (Tex. 2010); Henley v. Bell, 487 F.3d 379, 387–88 (6th
Cir. 2007).
166. See, e.g., Harrington, 310 S.W. 3d at 459–60 (holding that it was ineffective assistance of counsel for a
lawyer to fail to investigate a prior conviction in a Driving While Intoxicated offense when the prior was used to
elevate the charge to a felony). In Harrington, the defendant advised his lawyer that the prior was not his and the
lawyer advised defendant to plead guilty without any further investigation into the alleged prior conviction. Id.
The prior did not belong to the defendant. Id. at 455.
167. See NLADA PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 12, §§ 5.1–5.2.
168. This is such a common problem that one blog asked for criminal defense lawyers to report instances of
such conduct to the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Dextera Domini, Johnny K Clocks
Waxman, JUST. BUILDING BLOG (May 12, 2014), http://justicebuilding.blogspot.com/2014/05/johnny-k-clocks-
waxman.html.
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the plea offer, or to revoke it if the motion is lost. In determining whether the
lawyer was competent, the first question is: Did the lawyer know whether there
were any possible pretrial motions? Secondly, did the lawyer fully advise the client
about what might happen—including the probability of winning the motion—
giving the client an opportunity to decide whether to proceed or take the deal? A
lawyer should do both to meet the minimal standards of competency.
3. Possible Additional Charges or Sentencing Enhancements
The third basic determination a minimally competent lawyer needs to make in
the negotiation preparation phase is to find out if the defendant could be facing
more time due to additional sentencing enhancements or charges. A minimally
competent lawyer should know the possible sentencing enhancements and ask
questions to determine if any additional enhancements might apply.169 Defense
lawyers should also determine if there are other related charges that could be filed
in the case. Prior convictions can add years to a defendant’s sentence.170 Prosecu-
tors regularly allege prior convictions as part of the charging document.171 Rap
sheets and other records of prior convictions can also be part of the standard
discovery prosecutors give to defense lawyers.
The question, then, is what is the defense lawyer’s duty when the prosecutor
may not be immediately aware of the prior conviction? It can be a challenge for
defense lawyers to find this information before the prosecutor does and to secure a
plea deal without enhancements. Prosecutors often do not have information about
prior convictions at arraignment when they make the initial plea offer.172 If they
know the record is incomplete, they may delay making an offer, but prosecutors
169. Courts, however, have not yet held that there is a duty to advise about possible future penalty
enhancements if a defendant takes a plea deal. See, e.g., United States v. Reeves, 695 F.3d 637, 640–41 (7th Cir.
2012); United States v. Richie, No. 94 CR 633, 2013 WL 4082699, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2013).
170. For a discussion of how enhancements contribute to the power imbalance in plea negotiations, see Alkon,
supra note 11, at 598–601, 603–05.
171. Prior convictions can change what crime is charged. For example, California Penal Code section 666 is a
specific provision for the offense of petty theft where there is a prior conviction, so a prosecutor intending to
charge for that specific crime will put the prior conviction into the charging document. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 666 (West 2016). Prior convictions can also act to enhance penalties and therefore need to be part of the charges
filed. For example, federal prosecutors are advised that they “should regard the filing of . . . prior convictions as
equivalent to the filing of charges.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.300
(2014), http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution.
172. Amending the charges to add prior convictions once they are discovered is a standard part of criminal
practice. This regularly happened to my clients when I was a Deputy Public Defender in Los Angeles, often due to
the Three Strikes Law. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2016). The most difficult example was with a client who
had been charged with a second strike drug possession case. As a second-strike case her maximum penalty would
have been six years in prison. The prosecutor, however, found a prior from another jurisdiction and planned to
amend the charges to allege it as a third strike case, which carried a minimum penalty of twenty-five years to life
in prison. Unfortunately, on the day the prosecutor planned to amend the charges, the judge called the case in my
absence (I was next door handling a sentencing hearing after a jury trial). He did this despite the prosecutor
advising him that I had not had a chance to advise my client about the serious change in the case. The judge called
the case and my client was brought into the court with her two co-defendants. The prosecutor made the motion to
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are often unaware that they do not have this information for a few reasons. For
example, the prior may be from another state, so it may take a little longer to
discover it, and it may not show up on the initial rap sheet.173 Another common
situation is that the prior may be under a different name, and the defendant’s
various “AKAs” may not have caught up with him.174 This is a minefield for many
defendants. And, this is an important issue in the context of discussing whether to
accept or reject a particular plea offer as a defendant’s prior convictions could
radically change the possible punishment. A competent defense lawyer will
routinely explain this to their clients.175 A competent defense lawyer will also
specifically ask a client if they have any priors that the defense lawyer does not
currently know about.
However, as every defense lawyer knows, asking clients these questions does
not always mean that they will receive truthful or accurate answers.176 Sometimes
defendants have serious cognitive deficiencies, causing them to neither understand
nor be able to articulate their own prior convictions.177 Sometimes defendants
think that if they just keep quiet, their prior convictions will never be discov-
ered.178 Sometimes the priors are so old that defendants think they “aren’t good”
amend the charges against my client and announced the new maximum penalty. As the prosecutor told me
afterwards, as soon as my client heard the words “twenty-five years to life in prison,” she fainted.
173. For example, in Tarrant County, Texas, the court records do not include prior convictions from any other
county in Texas, much less from outside the state.
174. Defendants can have a variety of names for a number of reasons. Women who get married may change
their names. People may have nicknames that they use, and some people give false names when they are arrested.
Police officers may also write the name down incorrectly and that incorrect name could be listed as an “AKA.” If a
person had been arrested in multiple jurisdictions or has cases dating back a few decades under other names, it can
take time for the prosecutor to sort it out and get every relevant case associated with that person alleged in the new
case.
175. See ABA GUILTY PLEA STANDARDS, supra note 54, § 14-3.2 (“Defense counsel . . . should advise the
defendant of the alternatives available and address consideration deemed important by defense counsel . . . in
reaching a decision.”). Commentary to section 14-3.2 states that “[a] defendant also needs to know the probable
sentencing outcome.” Id. § 14-3.2 cmt.
176. Client interviewing and counseling texts regularly discuss this problem as it exists with all clients, not
only criminal defendants. See, e.g., KRIEGER & NEUMANN, supra note 151, at 104–06 (3d ed. 2007); DAVID A.
BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 247–68 (2d ed. 2004).
177. Up to ten percent of the prison population may be people with cognitive disabilities. See, e.g., Leigh Ann
Davis, People with Intellectual Disability in the Criminal Justice System: Victims & Suspects, THE ARC (Aug.
2009), http://www.thearc.org/page.aspx?pid2458.
178. When I was a Deputy Public Defender in Los Angeles, I regularly asked my clients a series of questions
about prior convictions when handling cases where the priors could matter. This included any felony case in
California (to determine if the client had a conviction that could be used as a strike under California Penal Code
section 667, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2016)) and driving under the influence of alcohol cases where
prior convictions changed the penalty and could—depending on the number of priors and the age of the
prior—increase the case to a felony. See CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 23540, 23546, 23550 (West 2016) (penalties for
driving under the influence with prior convictions within ten years). It was not unusual for a client to deny any
priors and then when the prosecutor discovered and alleged the prior, the client would say a version of, “I didn’t
think they would find it.”
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anymore or have forgotten about them.179 Regardless of why a defendant fails to
give an accurate answer, the key in terms of analyzing whether the defense lawyer
is competent is not whether the defendant gave the information, but whether the
lawyer asked the question and explained its significance—including why the
defendant should take the plea deal if there is any chance of a prior being found
that could be used to enhance the sentence. Further, if the defendant acknowledges
the existence of a prior that could be used to enhance the sentence, the defense
lawyer should advise the client about whether to take the deal as offered without
the additional enhancement. It may not always be advisable to take the deal even in
the face of possible enhancements. If, for example, there is a strong defense or a
strong likelihood that the case could ultimately be dismissed, a lawyer could
competently advise his or her client to not plead guilty.180
A minimally competent defense lawyer should also be aware of factual circum-
stances that could increase the defendant’s maximum penalty.181 For example, the
use of a gun or possession of a larger amount of drugs can add time to the possible
maximum sentence.182 If there is a gun mentioned in the police report, or lab
results with the weight of the drugs, but no gun or other appropriate enhancement
added to the charges, a defense lawyer should recognize that there has been a
possible oversight. A minimally competent defense lawyer will advise their client
about the possible enhancement and, if the plea offer is an otherwise good deal,
advise their client to take it before the enhancement is added.
B. The Negotiation Phase of Plea Bargaining
The specific question in Frye that Justice Kennedy did not want to address
concerns what constitutes competence in the negotiation process.183 There are
179. It is an understandable mistake as it is not always clear how long a prior can be used because there is not a
single rule applicable in all cases. In addition, the laws can change. For example, prior to the Three Strike Law in
California, there was no equivalent penalty and defendants were not advised about a possible three-strike
sentence. In addition, many defendants suffer from cognitive disabilities, mental illness, or substance abuse that
can make it more difficult for them to understand how and when prior convictions are valid and might be used
against them.
180. Twenty percent of all criminal cases were dismissed in Texas in 2012 and some categories of cases had
even higher dismissal rates. For example, 34.8% each of murder, sexual assault of an adult, and misdemeanor
cases were dismissed. STATE OF TEX. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS
JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 38 (2012), http://www.txcourts.gov/media/454873/2012-Annual-Report-2_1_1
3.pdf.
181. See, e.g., PAPERNO, supra note 132, at 73 (discussing questions to ask at the initial interview including if
the defendant is on probation or parole and about any prior arrests).
182. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.53 (a)–(b) (West 2016) (“[A]ny person who, in the commission of a
felony specified in subdivision (a), personally uses a firearm, shall be punished by an additional and consecutive
term of imprisonment in the state prison for 10 years. The firearm need not be operable or loaded for this
enhancement to apply.”).
183. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (referring to plea bargaining and stating that “it may be
neither prudent nor practicable to try to elaborate or define detailed standards for the proper discharge of defense
counsel’s participation in the process”).
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three bright lines that the Court could look to in examining whether a lawyer’s
performance in the negotiation process itself meets basic competency standards:
first, if the lawyer fails to even engage in plea bargaining and their client goes to
trial and gets convicted; second, if the lawyer fails to make a counter-offer when
there are grounds to do so; and third, if the lawyer is unaware of the “standard
offers” in particular kinds of cases and their client pleads out to a substantially
worse deal.
1. Failure to Negotiate a Plea Deal
Engaging in plea bargaining can be important due to the realities of the trial
penalty.184 Researchers report that defendants who go to trial and are found guilty
can receive prison sentences that are over four times higher than those who plead
guilty.185 Defense lawyers should know the possible penalty their client could face,
and at least seek a plea deal.186 There is, of course, no right to a plea bargain, which
means it is entirely within the discretion of the prosecutor to decide whether to
offer a deal.187 There are some cases, such as capital murder cases, where the
prosecution makes no offer regardless of what the defense lawyer does.188
However, even in cases where it is highly unlikely that the prosecution will make
an offer, the defense should still ask.189 As Jenny Roberts states, “the lack of a right
184. For a discussion of how the trial penalty impacts the negotiation atmosphere in plea bargaining, see
Alkon, supra note 11, at 603–05.
185. See Russell Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and Plea Bargaining,
91 MARQ. L. REV. 213, 224–30 (2007) (discussing that the actual trial penalty could be substantially higher due to
the fact that most statistics compare the sentence for similar charges and do not consider the fact that plea bargains
often include pleading guilty to a lesser offense than the one originally charged); Nancy J. King et al., When
Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five
Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 992 (2005) (reporting trial penalties ranging from thirteen percent to
461 percent, depending on the state and the offense); see also Berthoff v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 2d 50, 67–68
(D. Mass. 2001) (“Evidence of sentencing disparity visited on those who exercise their Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury is today stark, brutal, and incontrovertible.”).
186. For a discussion about whether it constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel to not engage in plea
negotiations due to a highly adversarial style, see Batra, supra note 20, at 330–31 (addressing Justice Scalia’s
dissent to Frye in which he asked, “does a hard-bargaining ‘personal style’ now violate the Sixth Amendment?”
(citing Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1413 (2012) (Scalia, J. dissenting))).
187. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977) (“[T]here is no constitutional right to plea bargain;
the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.”). With more serious cases, such as homicide, prosecutors
may not make any offer.
188. For example, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston did not offer a plea bargain in the Boston Marathon
bombing case to defendant Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. See Evan Perez, Boston Bombing Trial Lawyers Fail to Reach
Plea Deal, CNN (Jan. 5, 2015, 5:19 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/05/politics/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-trial-plea-
deal-fails/index.html (describing the Justice Department’s resistance to removing the death penalty as a
possibility). Tsarnaev was later convicted and sentenced to death. See Ann O’Neill, Aaron Cooper & Ray
Sanchez, Boston Marathon Bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Sentenced To Death, CNN (May 17, 2015, 3:46 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/15/us/boston-bombing-tsarnaev-sentence/index.html.
189. See ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, supra note 83, at 205 (“Plea discussions should be considered
the norm, and failure to seek such discussions an exception unless defense counsel concludes that sound reasons
exist for not doing do.”).
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to have the prosecution make an offer or even engage in plea bargaining
underscores the need for defense counsel who is effective at getting the prosecu-
tion to the bargaining table.”190
This question was presented by the recent appeal of O.J. Simpson from his
conviction for robbery. In that case, Simpson and five other men went to a hotel
room in Las Vegas to “reclaim” what Simpson said was his property.191 Only
Simpson and one of the other men went to trial. The other defendants pled guilty,
some in exchange for testifying at trial or for providing a voluntary statement to
the police.192 The men who pled guilty were sentenced to terms ranging from
probation to forty-eight months in prison.193 The fifth defendant was convicted
after being tried with Simpson and appealed his conviction on the grounds that
having Simpson as a co-defendant in the same trial was “undue prejudice.”194
After his conviction was overturned, the fifth defendant pled guilty to a probation-
ary term with time suspended.195 All five men completed their probation before
Simpson’s case came up on appeal.196 Simpson was convicted at trial of twelve
counts including kidnapping, assault, and conspiracy charges.197 He was sentenced
to a total of thirty-three years in prison and will be eligible for parole after serving
approximately one third of that time.198
Simpson appealed his conviction on a number of grounds, but the one that is
most interesting for this discussion is his allegation that his defense lawyer failed
to convey a plea offer.199 The district court in Nevada dismissed this ground for
appeal stating that “no evidence supports” that Simpson’s lawyer failed to convey
a plea offer.200 There was conflicting evidence about what offer or offers were
conveyed and the extent of the negotiation between the defense lawyers and
prosecutors.201 The court concluded that “the negotiations . . . lacked sufficient
clarity to be considered a formal offer”; that Simpson’s lawyer did convey the offer
and discuss the seriousness of the case with Simpson; and that because it was a
package deal with the fifth defendant, and the other defendant refused the deal,
190. Roberts, supra note 7, at 2665.
191. See Nevada v. Simpson, No. 07C237890-4, 2013 WL 6237199, at *1–3 (Nev. Dist. Nov. 26, 2013).
192. See id. at *10–11.
193. See id.
194. See id. at *11.
195. See id.
196. See id. at *10–11.
197. The twelve counts were: conspiracy to commit a crime; conspiracy to commit kidnapping; conspiracy to
commit robbery; burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon; first degree kidnapping with use of a deadly
weapon (two counts); robbery with use of a deadly weapon (two counts); robbery with use of a deadly weapon;
assault with use of a deadly weapon (two counts); and coercion with use of a deadly weapon (two counts). See id.
at *11–12. At sentencing, two of the charges were dismissed as redundant to the kidnapping charges. Id.
198. See O.J. Simpson Gets Up to 33 Years in Prison, CBS NEWS (Dec. 5, 2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/oj-simpson-gets-up-to-33-years-in-prison/.
199. See Simpson, 2013 WL 6237199, at *25–26.
200. See id. at *26.
201. See id. at *25–26, *42–43.
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there was not a valid offer.202
The Simpson case presents a few interesting questions. First, what should a
defense lawyer do if a client declares, “I’m not going to take more than county jail
time”? One version of events in the Simpson appeal is that Simpson was adamant
that he would not take prison time, and did not understand why he could not get the
probationary deals the prosecution was offering to other defendants.203 Clients
regularly make such declarations, and, equally, regularly back down from them.
Competent assistance of counsel requires a defense lawyer to negotiate the best
possible deal for the client and then to convey that offer. Due to the trial penalty, a
client’s declaration that they will not take any deals, or only take a deal with a
certain amount of jail time, or no jail time, should not prevent a competent defense
attorney from engaging in serious negotiations with the prosecution for the best
possible deal. And, if a fair offer is made, even if it is higher than what the
defendant states he wants, a competent defense attorney should fully advise a
client about the consequences of failing to take the deal. The district court in
Nevada found that Simpson’s lawyer did fully advise him of the consequences.204
A second question coming out of the Simpson case is whether it constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel to not get a formal offer on a case where it is
possible to do so.205 There were different accounts of whether there was even a
final plea offer and what its terms were, or whether there were merely “preliminary
discussions” and no formal offer.206 It is also unclear whether there were any
serious discussions about the “package deal” with the fifth defendant and whether
the prosecution would have ultimately allowed Simpson to plead separately.207 In
Simpson’s case, with its multiple charges and potentially long sentence, basic
competency requires serious plea negotiations and a concerted effort to get a final
offer from the prosecution.208 There are a number of factors to look to in
determining whether basic competency has been met under these circumstances.
First, did the lawyer ask for an offer? If the prosecution refused to make an offer or
insisted it had to be packaged with other defendants, did the lawyer push on this
202. See id. at *43.
203. See id. at *42–43.
204. See id. (“Mr. Galanter conveyed the offer to Mr. Simpson and advised him of the seriousness of the
case . . . .”).
205. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 2664 (“[I]f the prosecutor does not make an offer, must defense counsel take
steps to explore the alternatives? It is difficult to conceive of a counsel’s role, particularly in a system where so
many cases are resolved through bargaining, that does not include such a duty.”).
206. See Simpson, 2013 WL 6237199, at *41–43.
207. See id. at *43 (“To the extent that an offer was made, that offer was contingent on both defendants
accepting the offer. Mr. Stewart declined to resolve the case, so Mr. Simpson would not have been able to accept
the offer under the State’s terms.”). It is unclear, however, if the State would have agreed to make a separate offer
as it seems Simpson’s lawyer never asked.
208. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 2666–67 (referring to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice “Duty to
Explore Disposition Without Trial,” which states that pursuing plea discussions “should be considered the norm,
and failure to seek such discussions an exception”).
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point? Prosecutor’s offices are hierarchical structures. The final decision maker is
usually up the chain of command. If a defense lawyer does not get the offer they
want from the prosecutor assigned to the court, basic competency may require—
depending on the jurisdiction—that the defense lawyer try to get the offer from a
supervisor, or wait until the day of trial.209
2. Failure to Make a Counter Offer
The second bright line that the Court could look to when determining basic
competence during the negotiation phase is whether the defense lawyer failed to
make a counter-offer. However, not every plea negotiation requires extended offers
and counter-offers.210 As will be discussed below, there are cases with standard
offers where—in the absence of a reason to justify a better deal—it is not
incompetent assistance of counsel to fail to actually bargain and for the defendant
to accept the first offer the prosecutor makes. Yet, there are circumstances where
failing to try to get a better offer could be ineffective assistance of counsel. If
the defendant has a viable defense, this can be grounds for a better offer from the
prosecution. Depending on the discovery laws in the state, the defense may not be
required to divulge their defense to the prosecution until trial.211 Defense attorneys
in these states are often reluctant to give information to the prosecution because
surprising the prosecutor at or near trial creates a tactical advantage.212 However,
209. In more serious cases, prosecutors sometimes become more agreeable to making a better offer when they
are about to impanel a jury—especially in high volume urban courts when it is a day that the courts are full. Aging
cases may also help to get better deals as the evidence becomes weaker or due to an “unexpected pretrial or trial
development.” See HERMAN, supra note 141, at 80.
210. Defendants commonly accept the prosecutors’ offer. See Lande, supra note 110, at 15–16.
211. If the defense does not involve the introduction of evidence or witnesses beyond the prosecution case,
there is nothing for the defense to reveal before the trial begins. However, generally, under reciprocal discovery
laws, the defense is required to turn over evidence and witness names that they intend to introduce at trial. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.3(a) (West 2016) (“The defendant and his or her attorney shall disclose to the
prosecuting attorney: (1) The names and addresses of persons, other than the defendant, he or she intends to call
as witnesses at trial, together with any relevant written or recorded statements of those persons, or reports of the
statements of those persons, including any reports or statements of experts made in connection with the case, and
including the results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the
defendant intends to offer in evidence at the trial. (2) Any real evidence which the defendant intends to offer in
evidence at the trial.” (emphasis added)). Some states have time limits built into their laws and are not dependent
on when a defense lawyer may “intend” to offer the evidence at trial. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-16-4 (b)(1),
(b)(3)(C) (West 2015) (requiring the defense to turn over required discovery to the prosecution “no later than five
days before the trial” is due to begin).
212. Reciprocal discovery laws were fairly new in California when I first started working in the Los Angeles
County Public Defenders office in the early 1990s. More experienced defense lawyers had not been obligated to
turn over any information before trial and recommended turning over as little as possible as late in the process as
possible. Because the laws were new, our training programs routinely covered how to handle discovery including
advice to not turn over defense witness names and other information until we were sure the case was going to trial
and we could therefore “intend” to offer the evidence. Due to the frequency of plea bargaining, we had regular
discussions about when we “intended,” with some deputy public defenders maintaining they did not intend until
the trial actually began. One problem with this approach is that judges can exclude the evidence if they find that
the defense has not complied with discovery obligations. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.5(b). For a discussion
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for a variety of reasons, defendants may be unwilling to take their case to trial. The
decision of when, where, and how much information the defense should turn over
to the prosecution can be a difficult tactical question. And, a defense lawyer’s
decision of whether to turn over information is likely an area that the courts will be
hesitant to second-guess in the absence of a clear reason to do so.213
The question is whether there is ineffective assistance of counsel in the
negotiation process because the defense lawyer failed to engage in any meaningful
negotiation and the defendant accepted the first offer made. To answer this, one
factor to consider is whether there was information that could have assisted in the
negotiation that the defense lawyer failed to use, and whether that failure was due
to a legitimate tactical decision.214 For example, did the defense lawyer fail to
point out that their client had no criminal record and make a counter-offer
requesting diversion or a reduced sentence? If the prosecution’s case is weak, did
the defense lawyer make a counter-offer pointing out those weaknesses? There can
be tactical reasons to not raise the weaknesses in the prosecutor’s case. However,
experienced defense counsel understand that the prosecutor can often figure out
their possible defense. For example, in a driving under the influence of alcohol
case, the defense is either: The defendant wasn’t under the influence, or the
defendant wasn’t driving. If the defense is based on a problem with the evidence
gathered—for example, the breath machine had documented maintenance problems—
turning that information over to the prosecution has few downsides. The documen-
tary evidence is not going to change and it is strong evidence for the prosecutor to
use to either reduce the charge or dismiss the case. In this kind of a case, failing to
engage in negotiation with this additional information would be ineffective
assistance during the plea negotiation process.
3. Failure to Know the “Standard Offers”
The third bright line that the Court could use in examining whether a lawyer was
competent during the negotiation phase is to determine if the lawyer knew the
standard offers in the particular jurisdiction for similar cases. Leading negotiation
literature recommends that negotiators learn what the other side may agree to and
of the tactical questions surrounding when the defense should reveal information, see PAPERNO, supra note 12, at
161–62.
213. This would be consistent with the general approach the Court has taken when evaluating defense lawyer
competency starting with Strickland in 1984. See supra Section II.A and accompanying notes 60–67.
214. A related concern, discussed supra in Section IV.A, arises if the lawyer fails to do the basic preparation in
the case and does not find out information such as if there is a defense. As discussed above, a lawyer who fails to
do basic case preparation is providing ineffective assistance of counsel. The question here is premised on the
assumption that the lawyer knows the information, and considers whether it is ineffective assistance to fail to use
it in the context of plea negotiations.
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generate options.215 Part of negotiation preparation is trying to determine the
possible outcomes for the negotiation.216 In civil cases, this can mean knowing
what the insurance limits are. In criminal cases, the first question to ask is what is
the maximum punishment for the crime charged? But, as Stefanos Bibas points
out, this is the equivalent of the “sticker price” for a car as “only an ignorant,
ill-advised consumer would view full price as the norm and anything less as a
bargain.”217 The more important question is what is the standard offer for this type
of case?218 There are cases that do not have standard offers because they are more
complex, more varied, or more politically volatile.219 But, cases such as drug
possession, driving under the influence of alcohol, and drug sales lend themselves
to standardized treatment depending on the defendant’s record and the severity of
the case (for example, was the blood alcohol level .10 or .18?). Defense lawyers
should learn what to expect before making any recommendations to their client.
And, if the defense lawyer learns that the offer is not “standard” for the particular
court, she should use the standard offer to negotiate for a better deal.
Defense lawyers who practice in the same court for any period of time quickly
learn what is standard. The challenge is for lawyers who are new to the courthouse
or for lawyers generally to have a sense of standard offers in a jurisdiction as a
whole. For example, Los Angeles County has over forty courthouses.220 California
is not a sentencing guideline state, so there is no enforced uniformity beyond the
maximum sentences in the California Penal Code.221 The “standard offers” can
vary greatly between, for example, the court in Compton and in Norwalk. The way
to learn what to expect is to talk to lawyers practicing in the particular courthouse.
Stefanos Bibas criticizes the lack of easy and open access to this information, and
suggests collecting and distributing such information through sentencing commis-
sions.222 Depending on the jurisdiction, publicizing plea deals in the absence of
full information about the cases could be a political hot potato that could result in
worse deals as prosecutors will not want to be publicly seen as “going easy” on
215. See GETTING TO YES, supra note 99, at 42–81. Option generation is a concept that may have limited value
in plea bargaining. See Alkon supra note 11, at 605–08 (discussing the inapplicability of the negotiation concept
of Best Alternative to a Negotiated Solution (BATNA) in plea bargaining).
216. See, e.g., Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Aspirations in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 675 (2004); SHELL,
supra note 107, at 31–34.
217. Bibas, supra note 37, at 1138.
218. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 2671 (arguing that both likely trial outcomes and plea discounts are
“baselines for negotiation”).
219. The federal system and states that have sentencing guidelines may have more standardized approaches
even with more serious offenses.
220. See Courthouses in Los Angeles County, SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL.: CTY. OF LOS ANGELES, http://www.
lacourt.org/courthouse (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
221. California is not one of the twenty-one states with sentencing guidelines. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM 4 (July 2008), http://www.ncsc.org//media/
Microsites/Files/CSI/State_Sentencing_Guidelines.ashx.
222. See Bibas, supra note 37, at 1160.
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defendants. Jenny Roberts and Ronald Wright suggest a different approach that
could avoid this unintended consequence, which is that defender offices them-
selves could collect this information.223 If data were collected “in-house,” it would
give defense lawyers a place both to find out what the going rates are, and to
confirm the going rate. However, in terms of basic competency, in the absence of
good data collection, defense lawyers who are new to a court should ask their
colleagues what is normal in similar cases. A defense lawyer who fails to make
these basic inquiries before negotiating a plea deal, or at a minimum before
counseling a client about whether to accept the deal, is providing ineffective
assistance of counsel.
C. The Counseling Phase of Plea Bargaining
Client counseling can be extraordinarily complicated and lawyers struggle with
how to best communicate with their clients, particularly if they are juveniles or
suffer from cognitive disabilities.224 The Court has already established three basic
areas of minimum competency during the client counseling phase of plea bargain-
ing. First, as Lafler states, a defense lawyer should know the law and accurately
advise the defendant about their chances at trial in the context of giving advice
about whether to accept a plea deal.225 Second, as Frye stated, a lawyer should
advise their client of all plea offers.226 Third, a defense lawyer should advise their
client about the collateral immigration consequences of a guilty plea.227 A fourth
area that the Court has yet to establish is that minimum competency requires that a
defense lawyer know the possible maximum penalty in the case and advise the
client correctly about their possible sentence if they are convicted.228
Competent negotiation requires that defendants understand what will happen if
they do not agree to the plea deal. In negotiation terms, this is often referred to as
the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (“BATNA”).229 Due to the trial
penalty, there is a question about whether trial can be considered a “best
alternative” to a negotiated agreement in the context of plea negotiations.230
However, a defendant cannot evaluate whether a plea offer is good, or a trial is
223. See Roberts & Wright, supra note 128 (draft at 35) (“[D]efender offices need to collect—and, in many
jurisdictions, start to collect—better data to support their negotiations.”).
224. See generally Abbe Smith, “I Ain’t Takin’No Plea”: The Challenges in Counseling Young People Facing
Serious Time, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 11 (2007) (discussing the challenge of counseling juvenile defendants about
whether to go to trial or take deals in more serious cases).
225. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012).
226. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012).
227. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 357 (2010). If it is unclear what the immigration consequences will
be, the attorney should advise the client about the uncertainty. Id.
228. See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 679 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2012).
229. See GETTING TO YES, supra note 99, at 97–106. For a discussion of the BATNA as applied to plea
bargaining, see Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 115 (1997).
230. See Alkon, supra note 11, at 605–08.
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worth the risk, without knowing what the maximum possible sentence could be if
he is convicted. Sentencing laws can be complicated. It is not always easy to
calculate the possible maximum.231 However, this is basic information that every
defendant needs to know as part of the counseling process to decide whether to
accept a plea deal or not. Understanding and being able to calculate the maximum
sentence accurately is basic competency for any criminal defense lawyer in the
counseling phase of plea bargaining.
CONCLUSION
Nearly every defendant convicted of a crime in the United States is convicted
through the plea bargaining process.232 Through its decisions in Lafler and Frye,
the Supreme Court is finally showing a willingness to more critically examine plea
bargaining to better protect defendants’ rights. However, thus far, the Court’s
failure to understand negotiation has limited their focus to a single phase of plea
bargaining: The client counseling phase. It is time that the Court move beyond this
narrow focus and recognize the right to competent assistance of counsel during all
phases of plea bargaining. As this Article illustrates, doing so does not require the
Court to do something that is neither “prudent nor practicable.”233 Rather, the
Court needs to simply apply the already established standards in negotiation to
the plea bargaining context.
It is true that negotiating plea bargains is different from negotiating civil cases,
which is different still from negotiating a transactional deal. While these differ-
ences may mean that some negotiation theory is less applicable in the plea
bargaining context, there are still basic standards of competence in negotiation that
ought to apply regardless of the type of case being negotiated. The Court can and
should address how to better define basic competency in the context of plea
bargaining—the predominant process used to resolve criminal cases in this
country. To do so requires the Court to look beyond the view that negotiation is
simply about style, and to recognize that negotiation is a key lawyering skill; and
as such, can and should be subjected to analysis and scrutiny to ensure that every
defendant enjoys their basic constitutional right to counsel not only during trial,
but also during plea bargaining.
231. The O.J. Simpson case is a good example with twelve charges some of which would run concurrently and
some of which could run consecutively. See Nevada v. Simpson, No. 07C237890-4, 2013 WL 6237199, at *6–7
(Nev. Dist. Nov. 26, 2013).
232. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and
ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”); see also Galanter, supra note 2, at 495
(“From 1962 to 1991, the percentage of trials in criminal cases remained steady between approximately 13
percent to 15 percent. However, since 1991, the percentage of trials in criminal cases has steadily decreased (with
the exception of one slight increase of 0.06 percent in 2001): from 12.6 percent in 1991 to less than 4.7 percent in
2002.”).
233. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408.
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